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The Utah Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: 
Phillips and the Bill of Rights in Utah
Edwin Brown Firmage*
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwith­
standing.
Article VI, Clause *2 
United States Constitution
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Phillips1 denied the applica­
bility of the freedom of speech provisions of the first amendment (and 
by dicta any other provision of the Bill of Rights) as a protection of 
individual rights against state governments by way of the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. In so doing, the Utah Supreme 
Court defied2 or demonstrated ignorance of 3 over half a century of
*Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law, B.S., M.S., Brigham Young 
University; J.D., LL.M., S.J.D., University of Chicago; Fellow in Law and the 
Humanities, 1974-75, Harvard University. Appreciation is expressed to Mr. Darrell R. 
Larsen, J.D. 1976, my research assistant, for his help in the preparation of this article.
1. 540 P.2d 936 (Utah 1975). The five members of the Utah Supreme Court divided 
in two, three, and ultimately four directions in reaching the result in Phillips. The “ major­
ity”  opinion originally carried three members of the court, with Justice Ellett in agree­
ment with both the rationale and the result of the main opinion but also writing a separate 
concurring opinion commenting upon the validity of the fourteenth amendment. Two 
members joined in a dissenting opinion. Chief Justice Henriod was then listed as “ concur­
ring*’ in the majority opinion in the official opinion (locally termed the “green sheets” ) 
issued by the court. See U tah  C on st, art. 8, § 25. This three-member position supporting 
both the rationale and the holding of the majority opinion remained intact through the 
later publication of the advance sheets of Phillips, with Chief Justice Henriod still “ con­
curring”  in the majority opinion and Justice Ellett concurring in the rationale and the 
result, but also filing a separate concurring opinion. (“ I concur with the main opinion, 
but wish to comment on some statements in the dissenting opinion. . . .” ) After issuance 
of the official opinion (the “green sheets” ) and the publication of the advance sheets, 
however, Chief Justice Henriod changed his position as recorded in the bound volume of 
the West Reporter to “ concurring in the result.”  The status of Phillips as precedent is 
therefore of dubious worth, with the Utah court divided 2-2 on the rationale and the result 
announced in the “ majority” opinion, with one member concurring “ in the result.”
2. After asserting that the first amendment and the other amendments comprising 
the Bill-of Rights are “ simply, solely, expressly and utterly, nothing more and nothing less 
than a limitation upon the Congress of the United States and the powers of the federal 
government,”  the Utah court noted:
The foregoing is said in awareness of the proliferations that have occurred on 
the First Ten Amendments, and particularly by the use of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment, to extend and engraft upon the sovereign states, limitations intended only , 
for the federal government. *
Id. at 938. But see note 3 infra.
3. The court’s assertion of its awareness of “ the proliferations that have occurred
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United States Supreme Court case law holding to the contrary.4 It is late 
in the day of our country’s constitutional history to be forced to review 
the debate over and the objectives of the supremacy clause of our Con­
stitution by which its provisions were declared to be the “supreme Law 
of the Land,” state judges, state laws, and state constitutions to the 
contrary notwithstanding.5 It is only slightly less antiquarian to remem­
ber in print that the scope of judicial review6 extends to state executive, 
legislative, and judicial acts;7 that the substantive and procedural provi­
sions of the first amendment have been consistently held, since Gitlow 
v. New York8 in 1925, to apply against the states by way of the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment;9 that with two relatively 
minor exceptions,10 virtually every other procedural protection afforded 
the individual against the federal government by virtue of the Bill of 
Rights has now been guaranteed the individual against state govern­
ment via the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment;11 and 
that the United States Supreme Court has announced in many decisions 
a particular body of law which is binding upon the states when the issue 
is raised of the constitutionality of state legislation defining the parame­
on the First Ten- Amendments** included only old cases denying the applicability of the 
first ten amendments to the states. 540 P.2d at 938 n.2. To support its assertion that “ the 
United States Supreme Court has itself previously held that the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not make the First Ten Amendments applicable to the states,*’ the Utah Supreme 
Court cited Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), which was overruled by the United 
States Supreme Court in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). See Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145, 163 (1968) (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring) (arguing that on the issue of 
incorporation Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937), “ must be read as overruling 
Twining” ). As authority, the Utah Supreme Court also cited Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 
252 (1886), and Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875). 540 P.2d at 938 n.2.
4. None of the United States Supreme Court cases by which all major liberties of 
the Bill of Rights were held inviolate from state infringement through the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment from Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (free­
dom of speech) to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (unreasonable searches and seizures), 
and from Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination) to 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial), were cited by the Utah 
Supreme Court in its Phillips decision.
5. U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2.
6. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 87,1 Cranch 137 (1803).
7. E.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 120, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821); McCulloch v. Mary­
land, 17 U.S. 159, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 141,1 Wheat. 
304 (1816).
•8. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
9. E.g,, Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947); West Virginia State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). See Frankfurter, Memorandum on “Incorpo­
ration” of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
78 H arv. L. R ev. 746, 747-49 (1965).
10. The two exceptions are the seventh amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases 
where the amount in controversy exceeds twenty dollars, Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. 
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916), and the fifth amendment right to a grand jury indictment, 
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
11. See notes 85-102 infra and accompanying text.
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ters of legally acceptable expression.12 Such a review of these basic con­
stitutional principles nevertheless is made necessary by State v. 
Phillips. (Of course, the political wisdom of this trend toward the na­
tionalization of due process in the area of state criminal procedure may 
be questioned, and the Constitution provides means by which such 
United States Supreme Court case law may be modified or even re­
versed. There exist techniques or methods by which change or modifica­
tion in constitutional rules and the penumbra of constitutional common 
law emanating therefrom may be altered.13 The Phillips decision is not 
the way.) - '
In Phillips, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the convictions of three 
employees of the Adult Book and Cinema Store in Ogden who had been 
found guilty of distributing pornographic materials in violation of the 
Utah pornography statute.13 In rejecting the defendants’ claim that the 
Utah statute violated their constitutionally protected freedom of 
speech, the court held that the first amendment prohibition against 
federal infringement of freedom of speech is not binding against the 
states by way of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment:
[T]his provision [the first amendment] is simply, solely, expressly and 
utterly, nothing more and nothing less than a, limitation upon the Con­
gress of the United States and the powers of the federal government.
This is made abundantly clear by the other amendments adopted at 
the same time.
The reasonable and judicious approach to the application of these 
amendment [sic] [the Bill of Rights] requires that they be considered 
together, and in the light of the background and purposes for which they 
were adopted, and this applies with equal force and appropriateness to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which has been used to distort and nullify, in 
some measure, the purposes of the First Ten Amendments. . , .
The foregoing is said in awareness of the proliferations that have 
occurred on the First Ten Amendments, and particularly by the use of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, to extend and engraft upon the sovereign states, 
limitations intended only for the federal government.14
After finding that the first amendment afforded no protection 
against state infringement of free speech, the Utah court did not feel
12. Miller v, California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 
413, 418 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). For an analysis of the 
developments in the constitutional standard for state regulation of obscenity from Roth 
to Miller see Note, Obscenity, 87 H arv. L. R ev. 160 (1973). The Court recently reaffirmed 
the Miller standard in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974).
13. S ee, e.g., H . W e c h s le r ,  T h e  N a t io n a liz a t io n  o f  C iv il  L ib ertie s  and C iv il 
R igh ts  18-19 (1970); Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, 89 H arv . L . Rev. 1 (1975).
14. Ch. 196, § 76-10-1204, [1973] Utah Laws 679.
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obliged to analyze the defendants’ claim under the first amendment as 
demanded by Miller v, California,15 wherein the United States Supreme 
Court established a constitutional standard for the state regulation of 
obscenity. It simply held that the Utah statute did not violate the free 
expression provision of the Utah Constitution,16 thus placing itself in 
disobedience to over fifty years of case law of the United States Supreme 
Court declaring that the limitations upon federal procedural conduct in 
criminal trials established by the first amendment in particular, and 
later the Bill of Rights generally, was made applicable to the states 
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. This re­
fusal to honor Supreme Court decisions from Roth v. United States17 to 
Miller and beyond, when the Court, acting in its capacity as ultimate 
arbiter of federal constitutional issues, established a constitutional stan­
dard for state regulation of obscenity, places the Utah Supreme Court 
in violation of the supremacy clause in article VI, providing that the 
United States Constitution and other federal law is the “supreme Law 
of the Land.”
Justice Ellett, in his concurring opinion, again19 noted his belief 
that the fourteenth amendment is itself a nullity, being illegally ratified 
and adopted/ and is therefore not capable of being the vehicle by which 
any provisions of the Bill of Rights are made applicable to the states. 
Furthermore, in Justice Ellett’s view, the fourteenth amendment due 
process clause required only that the states provide a procedurally fair 
system, which he felt the state had satisfied in Phillips:
The dissenting opinion asserts that “The Fourteenth Amendment is 
a part of the Constitution of the United States.” While this same assertion
15. 540 P.2d at 938. See note 3 supra.
16. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
17. U tah  C on st , art. I, § 1.
18. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
19. Justice Ellett thoroughly explained his theory that the fourteenth amendment 
is a nullity in Dyett v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 403, 439 P.2d 266 (1968). In Dyett, the Utah 
Supreme Court rejected a habeas corpus petition and held that the defendant had “ know­
ingly and intelligently”  waived the right to assistance of counsel, which was a right 
protected under the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. Justice Ellett 
challenged the validity of the fourteenth amendment on the following grounds: (1) that 
the congressional resolution proposing the fourteenth amendment was not properly 
adopted by two-thirds of the full membership of Congress due to certain irregularities in 
seating southern senators and representatives, and (2) that the fourteenth amendment 
was not constitutionally ratified by three-fourths of the states, since many of the southern 
states ratified the fourteenth amendment “ under the duress of military occupation,”  (Id. 
at 412, 439 P.2d at 273) and some of those states which had ratified the fourteenth 
amendment subsequently retracted their ratification.
Dyett was the first in a line of decisions by Justice Ellett asserting that the fourteenth 
amendment was invalidly adopted and ratified. E.g., Buhler v. Stone, 533 P.2d 292, 295 
(Utah 1975)* (Ellett, J., dissenting) (“ I do not think the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution gives any rights to anybody.” ); State v. Richards, 26 Utah 2d 318, 
322, 489 P.2d 422, 425 (1971) (Ellett, J., concurring).
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has been made by the United States Supreme Court, that court has never 
held that the amendment was legally adopted. I cannot believe that any 
court, in full possession of its faculties, could honestly hold that the 
amendment was properly approved and adopted.
But even if it be assumed that Congress, by joint resolution, could 
compel the then Secretary of State to declare that the amendment had 
been approved by three fourths of the states of the Union, still there is no 
question in this case of lack of due process of law. The defendants were 
tried in a court of competent jurisdiction under rules of state law which 
applied to all alike. They were given notice of the charge against them and 
had a fair trial wherein they were afforded the rights to counsel, to be 
confronted by the witnesses, to testify and to give evidence in their own 
behalf.20
Whatever the historical merit of the conspiracy theory of the four­
teenth amendment,21 the time has long since passed that such a theory 
can be seriously entertained for purposes of declaring invalid22 a corner­
stone of a century’s constitutional law, especially by a state court.23 In 
some circumstances it is proper to thunder from the bench at judicial 
trends with which one disagrees,24 and this may be done by an inferior
20. 540 P.2d at 941-42 (emphasis in original).
21. Justice Ellett cited the following articles in support of his theory: McElwee, The 
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the Threat that it Poses 
to Our Democratic Government, 11 S. C ab. L.Q. 484 (1959); Suthon, The Dubious Origin 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 28 T u l.  L. R ev. 22 (1953). But see note 22 infra.
The mixed motivations of the proponents of the fourteenth amendment are analyzed 
in Graham, The “Conspiracy Theory”  of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 Y a le  L.J. 371 
(1938).
22. In Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), the Court reviewed the action of the 
Kansas Legislature in ratifying a proposed child labor amendment to the United States 
Constitution. On the basis of a thorough analysis of the ratification of the fourteenth 
amendment, including the disputed ratifications and withdrawals of three states as well 
as Seward’s proclamation of valid adoption of the amendment, the Court held that the 
issue of state ratification of a constitutional amendment was not justiciable on the follow­
ing grounds:
We think that in accordance with this historic precedent the question of the 
efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures, in the light of previous rejection or 
attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as a political question pertaining to the 
political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise 
of its control over the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment.
Id. at 450. Thus Justice Ellett’s challenge to the validity of the fourteenth amendment in 
Phillips presumes to rule on the constitutionality of the fourteenth amendment contrary 
to the United States Supreme Court’s position in Coleman that the separation of powers 
mandates that the resolution of the valid ratification of a constitutional amendment is a , 
political question for Congress, and is not a justiciable controversy. See Leser v. Garnett, 
258 U.S. 130,137 (1922) (“ As the legislatures of Tennessee and of West Virginia had power 
to adopt the resolutions of ratification, official notice to the Secretary, duly authenticated, 
that they had done so was conclusive upon him, and, being certified to by his proclama­
tion, is conclusive upon the courts.” ).
23. See notes 75-111 infra and accompanying text.
24. E.g., Cypert v. Washington County School Dist., 24 Utah 2d 419, 422, 473 P.2d 
887, 890 (1970) (“ Notwithstanding our emphatic disagreement with the majority in the 
Phoenix case, we realize that it is for the present to be recognized as the law . . . .” ).
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court toward an appellate body as well, as long as the forum recognizes 
that it is still bound by current and unambiguous case law of the appel­
late court. Arguably, Justice Ellett was within such a parameter of 
permissible judicial disagreement when in Dyett v. Turner,25 he stated 
that:
We have spoken in the hope that the Supreme Court of the United 
States may retreat from some of its recent decisions affecting the rights 
of a sovereign state to determine for itself what is proper procedure in its 
own courts as it affects its own citizens. However, we realize that because 
of that Court’s superior power, we must pay homage to it even though we 
disagree with it; and so we now discuss the merits of this case just the 
same as though the sword of Damocles did not hang over our heads.26
While he demonstrated “homage” toward the United States Su­
preme Court in Dyett by recognizing the binding quality of law with 
which he disagreed, Justice Ellett and the Utah Supreme Court recog­
nized no such inhibition in Phillips where the Utah court defied an 
unambiguous and controlling fifty year development of authoritative 
case law which holds that basic rights within the Bill of Rights, includ­
ing the first amendment, are protected against state action by the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Similarly and conse­
quently, Supreme Court case law defining the first and fourteenth 
amendments’ parameters within which states may regulate speech were 
ignored, thereby calling into question the rule of law at the top of the 
Utah judicial system. The situation is made worse, in the sense that the 
Utah court’s action was not only illegal but unnecessary, since the object 
of the court’s opinion, the control of pornography, can be accomplished 
within the confines of the first and fourteenth amendments as an­
nounced by Miller and its progeny.27
Justices Maughan and Tuckett in dissent followed the mandate of 
the United States Supreme Court and submitted the Utah statute in 
question in Phillips to an analysis within the context of Miller.28
This article analyzes the proper relationship between state legisla­
tion and case law and the United States Supreme Court as mandated 
by the supremacy clause; the “incorporation” doctrine and the relation­
ship between the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment; the
25. 20 Utah 2d 403, 439 P.2d 266 (1968).
26. Id. at 414-15, 439 P.2d at 274. See note 19 supra.
27. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 
483, 494 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54, 69 (1973); Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See text accompanying notes 115-19 infra.
28. Justices Maughan and Tuckett would have declared the Utah pornography stat­
ute unconstitutional as being overly broad and vague in defining the proscribed conduct, 
since the Utah statute regulated areas of expression which were protected by the first 
amendment from infringement by the states through the due process clause of the four­
teenth amendment, as the United States Supreme Court held in Miller. See 540 P.2d at 
946-47.
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current status of pornography law after. Miller, and concludes with a 
view of the nature of judicial professionalism, procedural justice, and 
the “rule of law.”
I. T he S upreme C ourt of U tah , th e  S upreme C ourt  of  the U nited 
S tates , and  the  S upremacy C lause
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power 
to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imper­
iled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several 
States.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.29
When the Utah Supreme Court refused to follow the case law pro­
nounced by the Supreme Court of the United States regarding the “in­
corporation” of seminal first amendment prohibitions against federal 
violation of rights of expression, religion, assembly, and petition into the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as a barrier against 
state violation of these rights, and failed to honor Supreme Court case 
law regarding the definition of obscenity in cases from Roth to Miller 
and beyond, it violated the supremacy clause of the Constitution. To 
do so two hundred years after the foundation of the Republic raises the 
question whether the Utah court feels itself bound by the rule of law. 
Shortly after the drafting of the Constitution, Judge Spencer Roane of 
Virginia and Chief Justice John Marshall debated in grand manner the 
issue of the degree to which state tribunals were bound to follow the 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court on matters of federal 
and constitutional law.30 Marshall won that debate, by position if not 
by persuasion, and the Civil War cemented that conclusion. The time 
and the manner in which the Utah court reopens that debate takes us 
in descent from the excitement of high politics, when such questions of 
federalism were truly open,31 to an intransigence marked by reaction and
29. O.W. H olm es, Law and the Court, in C o l le c t e d  L e g a l  P apers 291, 295-96 
(1920).
30. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 120, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821); McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 159, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 141, 1 
Wheat. 304 (1816); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 87, 1 Cranch 137 (1803); G. Gunther, 
John M a r s h a ll ’s  D e fen se  o f  M cC ulloch  v. M a ry la n d  1-21 (1969); Gunther, John Mar­
shall, “A Friend of the Constitution” : In Defense and Elaboration of McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 449 (1969). For modem affirmation of this constitutional 
debate see Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 
506 (1859); c f  Williams v. Bruffy, 102 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1880).
31. Serious debates over the nature of the federal union continued after the classic 
exchanges between John Marshall, Spencer Roane, and Thomas Jefferson, but took on 
the more ominous overtones of the sectional conflict which led ultimately to the Civil War. 
The major spokesmen and antagonists in this later dialogue were President Andrew Jack­
son and John C. Calhoun, the proponent of nullification and interposition. These two 
theories were defined by Calhoun:
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disregard of the rule of law.32
The supremacy clause was the culmination of one of the most deli-
Nullification—as declaring null an unconstitutional act of the General Govern­
ment, as far as the state is concerned. Interposition—as throwing the shield of 
protection between the citizens of a State and the encroachments of the General 
Government.
D. T ip ton , N u ll i f ic a t io n  and In terp osit ion  in Am erican  P o l i t i c a l  T h o u g h t 7 (1969). The 
issues raised by nullification and interposition, i.e., “ the nature of the union, and . . . 
the proper relationship between the rule of a majority and the rights of a minority,”  are 
vital to our federal constitutional system and have persisted from Calhoun’s time to the 
present. Id. at 15.
The nullification controversy flared in South Carolina in 1832 when the South Caro­
lina Legislature drafted the Ordinance of Nullification to oppose the Tariff Act of July 
14, 1832 passed by Congress. South Carolina passed legislation to prohibit the payment 
of duties or to recover those duties already paid by seizing the personal effects of any 
federal authority who failed to return the duties paid. Further, appeals to the United 
States Supreme Court were blocked by penalties to be imposed on any clerk of a court 
who allowed papers to be filed obstructing the enforcement of the Act. South Carolina 
provided for military defense in the event federal authorities offered resistance or coerced 
the state into obeying the congressional enactment. President Jackson delivered the fol­
lowing proclamation to South Carolina: ,
I consider, then, the power to annul a law of the United States, assumed by one 
State, incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted expressly by the 
letter of the Constitution, unauthorized by its spirit, inconsistent with every princi­
ple on which it was founded, and destructive of the great object for which it was 
formed.
Id. at 38. While the confrontation between South Carolina and the federal government 
was eventually resolved by South Carolina’s rescission of the Ordinance of Nullification, 
the debate over the precise nature of the federal union, with federal and state sovereign­
ties, has continued.
For an excellent analysis of the early debate over the specific nature of the American 
federal system see id. at 6-14.
The United States Supreme Court raised the fundamental objections to the interposi­
tion of a state opposing an act of the federal government in the early decision of United 
States v. Peters, 9 U.S. 65, 5 Cranch 115 (1809). In Peters, Chief Justice Marshall rejected 
Pennsylvania’s legislation effectively depriving the federal district court of admiralty 
jurisdiction over a vessel captured by a vessel owned by the State of Pennsylvania, and 
stated:
If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of the 
courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, 
the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery; and the nation is deprived of the 
means of enforcing its laws by the instrumentality of its own tribunals. So fatal a 
result must be deprecated by all; and the people of Pennsylvania, not less than the 
citizens of every other state, must feel a deep interest in resisting principles so 
destructive of the Union, and in averting consequences so fatal to themselves.
Id. at 77, 5 Cranch at 136. Interposition can be accomplished judicially as well as legisla­
tively when the state courts resist the rule of law established by the federal government 
operating within its proper constitutional parameters. See D. T ip ton , supra, at 34-42.
32. The rhetoric offered by the Utah court in the place of the legal analysis appropri­
ate in such cases where constitutional interpretation is at issue is illustrated by the 
following example:
We feel like galley slaves chained to our oars by a power from which we cannot free 
ourselves, but like slaves of old we think we must cry out when we can see the boat
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heading into the maelstrom directly ahead of us; and by doing so, we hope the 
master of the craft will heed the call and avert the dangers which confront us all. 
But by raising our voices in protest we, like the galley slaves of old, expect to be 
lashed for doing so. . . . We shall not complain if those who berate us belong to 
that small group who refuse to take an oath that they will not overthrow this 
government by force. When we bare our legal backs to receive the verbal lashes,
. we will try to be brave; and should the great court of these United States decide 
that in our thinking we have committed error, then we shall indeed feel honored, 
for we will then be placed on an equal footing with all those great justices who at 
this late date are also said to have been in error for so many years.
Dyett v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 403, 405-06, 439 P.2d 266, 268 (1968).
The most recent example of the Utah Supreme Court’s failure to analyze properly 
federal constitutional issues inherent in state legislation arose in Turner v. Department 
of Employment Security, 531 P.2d 870 (Utah 1975), vacated per curiam, 44 U.S.L.W. 3295 
(U.S. Nov. 17, 1975), where the Utah Supreme Court analyzed the issue before the court 
as follows:
Should a man be unable to work because he was pregnant, the statute would apply 
to him equally as it does to her. What she should do is to work for the repeal of the 
biological law of nature. She should get it amended so that men shared equally with 
women in bearing children. If she could prevail upon the Great Creator to so order 
things, she would be guilty of violating the equal protection of the law unless she 
saw to it that man could also share in the thrill and glory of Motherhood.
531 P.2d at 871. The United States Supreme Court reversed the state court and struck 
down the Utah statute which denied unemployment benefits to an expectant mother 
during the last three months of pregnancy and for the first six weeks after birth. For 
Justice Ellett’s reaction to the United States Supreme Court’s opinion, see Salt Lake 
Tribune, Nov. 18, 1975, § 1, at 8, col. 1, accusing the Supreme Court of “ entering into 
affairs that are not its business.”  Id. col. 2.
The Utah Supreme Court in Manning v. Sevier County, 30 Utah 2d 305, 517 P.2d 549 
(1973), held that the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment were 
“ made applicable to State action by the Fourteenth Amendment,”  and construed the 
state statute in light of appropriate United States Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 308­
09 & n.l, 517 P.2d at 551 & n.l. The Utah Supreme Court made no mention of this 
precedent in considering the incorporation doctrine in Phillips.
The role of the jurist in honoring and protecting the principles of procedural justice 
extend beyond legal interpretation per se to being the living embodiment of fairness and 
objectivity, in judicious and compassionate demeanor as well as in judicial action. Canon 
Three of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires:
(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence 
in it. He should be unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criti­
cism.
(2) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before him.
(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, wit­
nesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his official capacity, and should 
require similar conduct of lawyers, and of his staff, court officials, and others 
subject to his direction and control.
ABA C od e  o f  J u d icia l C o n d u ct N o . 3(A).
In In re Rome, 542 P.2d 676 (Kan. 1975), the Supreme Court of Kansas censured a 
municipal court judge under Canon 3(A)(3) for a memorandum opinion issued by the 
judge in a prostitution prosecution which was phrased in a poetic form that “ allegedly 
[held] out a litigant to public ridicule or scorn.”  Id. at 684. The poetic memorandum 
opinion contained the following objectionable passages:
On January 30th, 1974,
This lass agreed to work as a whore.
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tional convention in Philadelphia. The founding fathers feared a vast 
centralization of power in the federal government, as noted by the Utah
Her great mistake, as was to unfold,
Was the enticing of a cop named Harold.
Unknown to ____, this officer, sumamed Harris,
Was duty-bent on ____’s lot to embarrass.
At the Brass Rail they met,
And for twenty dollars the trick was all set.
In separate cars they did pursue,
To the sensuous apartment o f____
Bound for her bed she spared not a minute,
Followed by Harris with his heart not in it!
As she prepared to repose there in her bay,
She was arrested by Harris, to her great dismay!
Id. at 680. Of the judge’s responsibility to be “patient, dignified, and courteous to liti­
gants,”  the court stated:
Judges simply should not “ wisecrack”  at the expense of anyone connected with 
a judicial proceeding who is not in a position to reply. . . . Nor should a judge do 
anything to exalt himself above anyone appearing as a litigant before him. Because 
of his unusual role a judge should be objective in his task and mindful that the 
damaging effect of his improprieties may be out of proportion to their actual seri­
ousness. He is expected to act in a manner inspiring confidence that even-handed 
treatment is afforded to everyone coming into contact with the judicial system.
Id. at 685.
Compare the requirements of Canon Three with the following excerpts from opinions 
of the Utah Supreme Court, which indicate the treatment that some litigants and others 
have received in some cases from the state’s highest court. In Christensen v. Christensen, 
18 Utah 2d 315, 422 P.2d 534 (1967), the court affirmed the distribution of marital assets 
as decided by the trial court in a divorce action, and described the facts as follows:
The dove of peace dropped the olive branch soon after the honeymoon, during which 
the bride paid her own expenses,—a new concept perhaps born of the new insistence 
that women must be paid the same salaries as their darlings. Mr. C. hit Mrs. C. 
over the head with a large package of kitchen cleaner called Babo,—hardly an 
appropriate instrumentality to cleanse a soiled marital wardrobe.
Id. at 317, 422 P.2d at 535.
Continuing in the same vein, the court justified the distribution of marital assets on 
several factors, including the fact that Mrs. C. “ did not know that she would have to forego 
the government payment which was created by a previous husband, when she sought the 
arms of her lover, without knowing of his propensity for laying on the head of a female, 
not hands, but Babo cans.”  Id. at 319, 422 P.2d at 536.
In Sorensen v. Sorensen, 18 Utah 2d 102, 417 P.2d 118 (1966), the court upheld an 
award of child custody to a young father with the following comments made at the expense 
of the litigants before the court:
The litigants, a couple of kids, 19 and 17, did what comes naturally, and were 
married two months after a son Troy fell, an unwilling participant in this law­
suit,—to be but a bouncing ball for a couple of either conceptionists or misconcep- 
tionists.
Mother says father was a cad, an opinion that apparently she did not subscribe 
to a few months before. Father says mother was a no good, an opinion that he did 
not share during his God-given biological urge.
. . . She picks out all of the evidence in her favor, but neglects to point out
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court,33 but it was not that fear that had driven them to Philadelphia 
in frustration. Rather, it was the condition of virtual powerlessness of 
the national government under the Articles of Confederation which led 
them to understand that while absolute power may corrupt absolutely, 
something approaching absolute impotence may have the same effect. 
The Constitution represented a masterful combination of compromises 
and insights into the nature of man, providing power, yet harnessing it; 
separating power horizontally between branches of a federal government 
ideally in tension with each other, though colleagues in governance; 
dividing power both vertically and horizontally between the states and 
the federal government, each being coordinate in certain spheres of 
governance, yet lodging truly national power in the federal government; 
and finally and most relevant to Phillips, protecting certain rights of 
individual human beings against the powers of any level of government, 
federal or state. While a fuller realization of the accomplishments re­
flected within the Constitution had to await the Civil War and subse­
quent constitutional amendments, the seeds were there.34 One of the 
final acts of the Philadelphia Convention was to decide how this careful 
blend of apportioned power reflected in the Constitution was to be pre­
served, against either disintegration or undue centralization. How could 
the necessary supremacy of the Constitution and federal law be assured 
without usurping the powers of the states? Should the Constitution 
create a full-blown system of federal courts beneath the Supreme Court 
to protect the national interest? Could state courts uniformly interpret 
the great charter?
One of the critical compromises at Philadelphia was the decision 
reflected in article IE, section 1 of the Constitution to leave the question 
of the creation of a federal judiciary below the Supreme Court to Con­
gress. The central importance of a supremacy clause thereby became 
even more apparent. Madison noted in The Federalist that the failure 
to design a government in which the Constitution and national law were 
supreme over state law would create
a system of government founded on an inversion of the fundamental prin­
ciples of all government; it would have seen the authority of the whole 
society everywhere subordinate to the authority of the parts; it would have 
seen a monster in which the head was under the direction of the mem­
bers.35
some of the evidence in favor of Huckleberry Finn. On appeal we review the record 
in favor of Huckleberry.
Id. at 103-04, 417 P.2d at 119.
33. 540 P.2d at 939. '
34. Crosskey has argued that the Bill of Rights was intended from the beginning as 
a limitation on state action, with the exception of the first and seventh amendments which 
by their terms speak of Congress and courts of the United States. See II W. C rosskey, 
P o li t ic s  and th e  C o n st itu tio n  in th e  H is to ry  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  1056-82 (1953); U.S. 
C on st, art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See note 66 infra.
35. T h e  F e d e ra lis t  No. 44, at 147 (Great Books ed. 1952) (J. Madison).
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Similarly, Hamilton argued in favor of state judiciaries being subordi­
nate to the Supreme Court in interpreting constitutional issues:
Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, 
arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, from which nothing 
but contradiction and confusion can proceed.30
Justice Joseph Story also supported the supremacy of the Constitution 
and national law, stating that the “propriety” of the supremacy clause 
arose “from the very nature of the Constitution,” and that
[i]f [the Constitution] was to establish a national government, that 
government ought, to the extent of its powers and rights, to be supreme.
It would be a perfect solecism to affirm that a national government should 
exist with certain powers, and yet that in the exercise of those powers it 
should not be supreme.37
Finally, Madison clearly expressed his overriding concern that states 
should not be empowered to render impotent the rights of the people 
recognized by the Constitution and by federal law:
The necessity of some constitutional and effective provision guarding the 
Constn. & laws of the Union, agst. violations of them by the laws of the 
States, was felt and taken for granted by all from the commencement, to 
the conclusion of the work performed by the Convention. Every vote in 
the Journal involving the opinion, proves a unanimity among the Deputa­
tions on this point. A voluntary & unvaried concurrence of so many, (then 
13 with a prospect of continued increase), distinct & independent authori­
ties, in expounding & acting on a rule of Conduct, which must be the same 
for all, or in force in none, was a calculation, forbidden by a knowledge of 
human nature, and especially so by the experience of the Confederacy, the 
defects of which were to be supplied by the Convention.38
Article III, section 2 of the Constitution defines the scope of the 
federal judicial power, providing that it “shall extend to all Cases, in 
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution.”39 Further, the Su­
preme Court “shall have appellate Jurisdiction . . . with such Excep­
tions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”40 Sec­
tion 25 of the Judiciary Act of 178941 interpreted this constitutional 
section to provide for review over state court decisions upholding the 
validity of state legislation which is allegedly repugnant to the Constitu­
tion.42 On the basis of these constitutional mandates and historical
36. Id. No. 80, at 235 (A. Hamilton).
37. II J. S t o r y ,  C om m en taries  on  t h e  C o n st itu tio n  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta tes  579 
(1873).
38. i n  M . F arran d , T h e  R e co rd s  o f t h e  F e d e ra l C on ven tion  o f  1787, at 527 (1911).
39. U.S. C on st, art. IE, § 2, cl. 1.
40. Id. cl. 2.
41. Ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85-87. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970).
42. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Lawt 73 H arv. L. 
R ev. 1, 3-5 (1959).
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directives, state courts interpreting such legislation are bound by the 
constitutional precedent established by the United States Supreme 
Court in construing specific constitutional provisions. It may be that 
there are discrete textual mandates in the Constitution granting a final 
and nonreviewable lawmaking power to another branch of government,43 
but no such issue is raised by Phillips.
Beginning primarily44 with the United States Supreme Court deci­
sion of Marbury v. Madison,45 the principle that our courts may, in a 
justiciable framework, review the lawmaking acts of other branches of 
government and of inferior courts, and declare such acts void if they 
violate the Constitution has become firmly established within the ma­
trix of our constitutional fabric. Powerful arguments were raised against 
this notion,46 but it prevailed and came to represent a bulwark of repub­
lican government,47 a protection for minorities against an undisciplined
43. See Firmage & Mangrum, Removal of the President: Resignation and the Proce­
dural Law of Impeachment, 1974 Duke L.J. 1023,1078-85 (the constitutional mandate to 
the Senate to try impeachments).
44. P rior to  Marbury, state courts and  the fram ers o f  the Constitution  relied upon 
the doctrine o f  ju d ic ia l review  to  h old  th at the ju d ic ia l power, under a constitutional 
system , im plicitly  authorized the courts to  review  legislation and to  declare it  invalid 
when such  legislation  con flicted  w ith the fundam ental law  o f  the nation . See, e.g., Rutgers 
v. W addington  (N .Y .C . M ayor’s Ct. 1784), in S e le c t  Cases o f  th e  M a y o r ’s C o u r t  o f  N ew  
Y o r k  C ity  302 (R . M orris ed . 1935); D en ex dem. Bayard v. Singleton, 1 M artin  42 (N .C . 
1787); Cases o f  the Judges, 8 Va. (4 C all.) 135 (1788); C om m onw ealth  v . Caton, 8 Va. (4 
C all.) 5 (1782). T h ese early state court decisions are described and analyzed in 1 J. 
G oeb e l, H is to ry  o f  t h e  Suprem e C o u r t  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s : A n te ce d e n ts  and B egin ­
nings t o  1801, at 125-41 (1971). N otions o f  ju d ic ia l review  were prevalent prior to  and 
during the C onstitutional C onvention , in part in relation to  the proposed C ouncil o f  
R evision w hich  com bined  m em bers o f  the E xecutive and the Jud iciary  in vetoing legisla­
tion. See, e.g., 5 J. E l l i o t ,  D ebates  on  th e  A d op tion  o f  th e  F e d e ra l C on stitu tion  151 
(1937) (reported b y  Jam es M a d ison ); I M . F arran d , supra note 38, at 96-101; HI id. at 
133. For notions o f  ju d ic ia l review  outside the Constitutional C onvention  see T h e  F e d e ra l­
is t  N o . 78, a t 229-33 (G reat B ooks ed . 1952) (A . H am ilton ); id. N o. 82, at 243.
45. 5 U.S. 87, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
46. Judge Spencer Roane of Virginia, for example, a leading states* rights advocate, 
stated:
Th3 Constitution of the United States was formed by the sanction of the states, 
given by each in its sovereign capacity. It adds to the stability and dignity, as well 
as to the authority of the Constitution, that it rests on this legitimate and solid 
foundation. The states then being the parties to the constitutional compact, and 
in their sovereign capacity, it follows of necessity, that there can be no tribunal 
above their authority, to decide in the last resort, whether the compact made by 
them violated; and consequently that as the parties to it, they must themselves 
decide in the last resort, such questions as may be of sufficient magnitude to require 
their interposition.
G . G u n th er, supra note 30, at 61-62. See Madison*s Observations onJefferson’s Draft of 
a Constitution for Virginia, in 6 T h e  P apers o f  Thom as J e ffe r s o n  315 (J. Boyd ed. 1952), 
wherein Madison stated that allowing courts to invalidate legislation would make “ the 
Judiciary Department paramount in fact to the Legislature, which was never intended and 
can never be proper.”
47. The doctrine of judicial review under the American constitutional system has
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majoritarianism which could otherwise obliterate constitutional protec­
tions and prerogatives.48 Since Martin v. Hunter's Lessee49 and Cohens 
v. Virginia,50 there is no question that the Supreme Court’s power of 
judicial review extends to review of state court decisions and state legis­
lation. Neither is there any ambiguity regarding the biftding nature for 
the state court of Supreme Court pronouncements interpreting the Con­
stitution. Chief Justice Joseph Story, delivering the opinion of the Court 
in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, observed:
It is a mistake, that the constitution was not designed to operate upon 
states, in their corporate capacities. It is crowded with provisions which 
restrain or annul the sovereignty of the states; in some of the highest 
branches of their prerogatives. The tenth section of the first article con­
tains a long list of disabilities and prohibitions imposed upon the states. 
Surely, when such essential portions of state sovereignty are taken away, 
or prohibited to be exercised, it cannot be correctly asserted, that the 
constitution does not act upon the states. The language of the constitution 
is also imperative upon the states, as to the performance of many duties.
It is imperative upon the state legislatures, to make laws prescribing the 
time, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representa­
tives, and for electors of president and vice-president. And in these, as well 
as some other cases, congress have a right to revise, amend or supersede 
the laws which may be passed by state legislatures. When, therefore, the 
states are stripped of some of the highest attributes of sovereignty, and
become a model for the development of some foreign constitutional systems of govern­
ment. See, e.g., Cappelletti & Adams, Judicial Review of Legislation: European Antece­
dents and Adaptations, 79 H arv. L. R ev. 1207 (1966); Cole, Three Constitutional Courts: 
A Comparison, 53 Am. P o l .  S ci. R ev . 963 (1959).
48. E.g., C. B eard , T h e  Suprem e C o u r t  and th e  C o n st itu tio n  93 (1962) (based on 
an analysis of Madison’s notes on the Convention, Beard concluded that the members of 
the Convention sought “ to set up a system of government that would be stable and 
efficient, safe-guarded on one hand against the possibilities of despotism and on the other 
against the onslaught of majorities.” ); R. B e rg e r , C on g ress  v. T h e  Suprem e C o u r t  16-21 
(1969). Madison, in the Constitutional Convention, supported the Council of Revision 
proposal to combine the Judiciary and the Executive in a review function over legislation 
“ for the safety of a minority in Danger of oppression from an unjust and interested 
majority.”  I M. F arran d , supra note 38, at 108.
49. 14 U.S. 121,1 Wheat. 304 (1816).
50. 19 U.S. 120, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821). In Cohens v. Virginia, the Court reviewed an 
alleged conflict between a Virginia criminal statute and a federal statute and held that 
while there was no conflict, the Court had the authority and the constitutional duty to 
review state court decisions bearing on federal constitutional issues, since the “ states are 
constituent parts of the United States; they are members of one great empire—for some 
purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate.”  Id. at 185, 6 Wheat, at 414.
In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, the Court rejected Judge Spencer Roane’s assertion that 
the United States Supreme Court did not have appellate jurisdiction over a Virginia 
Supreme Court decision affecting the title to Virginia property which was also claimed 
by a British citizen under a federal treaty. Of a state judge’s “ judicial duties,”  the Court 
stated that state judges “ were not to decide merely according to the laws or constitution 
of the state, but according to the constitution, laws and treaties of the United States—‘the 
supreme law of the land.’ ”  14 U.S. at 157, 1 Wheat, at 340-41.
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the same are given to the United States; when the legislatures of the states 
are, in some respects, under the control of congress, and in every case are, 
under the constitution, bound by the paramount authority of the United 
States; it is certainly difficult to support the argument, that the appellate 
power over the decisions of state courts is contrary to the genius of our 
institutions. The courts of the United States can, without question, revise 
the proceedings of the executive and legislative authorities of the states, 
and if they are found to be contrary to the constitution, may declare them 
to be of no legal validity. Surely, the exercise of the same right over 
judicial tribunals is not a higher or more dangerous act of sovereign 
power.51
In a lawmaking statement which applies with equal force to state court 
judges today, as it did to Spencer Roane and the Virginia court in 1816, 
Story ruled:
Nor can such a right [judicial review] be deemed to impair the 
independence of state judges. It is assuming the very ground in contro­
versy, to assert that they possess an absolute independence of the United 
States. In respect to the powers granted to the United States, they are not 
independent; they are expressly bound to obedience, by the letter of the 
constitution; and if they should unintentionally transcend their authority, 
or misconstrue the constitution, there is no more reason for giving their 
judgments an absolute and irresistible force, than for giving it to the acts 
of the other co-ordinate departments of state sovereignty.
It has been further argued against the existence of this appellate 
power, that it would form a novelty in our judicial institutions. This is 
certainly a mistake. In the articles of confederation, an instrument framed 
with infinitely more deference to state rights and state jealousies, a power 
was given to congress to establish “courts for revising and determining, 
finally, appeals in all cases of captures.” It is remarkable, that no power 
was given to entertain original jurisdiction in such cases; and conse­
quently, the appellate power (although not so expressed in terms) was 
altogether to be exercised in revising the decisions of state tribunals. This 
was, undoubtedly, so far a surrender of state sovereignty; but it never was 
supposed to be a power fraught with public danger, or destructive of the 
independence of state judges. On the contrary, it was supposed to be a 
power indispensable to the public safety, inasmuch as our national rights 
might otherwise be compromitted, and our national peace be endan­
gered.52
In Cohens v. Virginia the Great Chief Justice also spoke the lan­
guage of nationalism over parochial factionalism:
That the United States form, for many, and for most important purposes, 
a single nation, has not yet been denied. In war, we are one people. In 
making peace, we are one people. In all commercial regulations, we are
51. Id. at 158-59, 1 Wheat, at 343-44.
52. Id. at 159, 1 Wheat, at 344-45.
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one and the same people. In many other respects, the American people 
are one; and the government which is alone capable of controlling and 
managing their interests in all these respects, is the government of the 
Union. It is their government, and in that character, they have no other. 
America has chosen to be, in many respects, and to many purposes, a 
nation; and for all these purposes, her government is complete; to all these 
objects, it is competent. The people have declared, that in the exercise of 
all powers given for these objects, it is supreme. It can, then, in effecting 
these objects, legitimately control all individuals or governments within 
the American territory. The constitution and laws of a state, so far as they 
are repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States, are abso­
lutely void. These states are constituent parts of the United States; they 
are members of one great empire—for some purposes sovereign, for some 
purposes subordinate.53
For Marshall and Story, as for Madison, Morris, and those who 
dominated the Philadelphia Convention and shaped our country’s insti­
tutions directly thereafter, ultimate sovereignty lay not with the states, 
but with the people.54 After Roger Taney succeeded Marshall, however, 
a moderating trend occurred away from the more extremely nationalis­
tic opinions of the Marshall Court.55 But the necessity of obedience by
53. 19 U.S. at 185, 6 Wheat, at 413-14.
54. E.g., I M. F arran d , supra note 38, at 123 (remarks of Mr. Madison); II id. at 
92-93 (remarks of Gouvemeur Morris); G . G u n th er, supra note 30, at 85-86 (Chief Justice 
John Marshall) (“ The confederation was a mere alliance offensive and defensive, and 
purports to be, what it was intended to be,—the act of sovereign states. The constitution 
is a government acting on the people, and purports to be, what it was intended to be,—the 
act of the people.” ).
55. In Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 341,11 Pet. 420 (1837), Chief 
Justice Taney, writing for the Court, strictly construed a public contract granting the 
privilege to build a bridge and collect tolls and held that the contract did not preclude 
the state from authorizing a competing bridge. Expressing a concern for local and state 
interests, Taney stated:
We cannot deal thus with the rights reserved to the states; and by legal intendments 
and mere technical reasoning, take away from them any portion of that power over 
their own internal police and improvement, which is so necessary to their well being 
and prosperity.
Id. at 434, 11 Pet. at 552. In noting the trend of the Taney Court, which began in the 
Charles River Bridge case, one commentator stated:
The work of the 1837 term thus marked the beginning of a new order. The 
transition was not a sharp one, and those who saw it as such were mistaken. In spite 
of the radical doctrines sponsored by some Jacksonians of the time, the Court was 
careful to adhere to traditional patterns. In the Bridge Case, for example, there was 
no challenge to the status of the charter of a private corporation as a contract. The 
holding of the Marshall Court in the Dartmouth College Case stood firm. The same 
was true of the other highly controversial cases of this term. The change was lim­
ited, sometimes almost infinitesimal, and yet it was there. There was a greater 
tendency to look to items of local welfare and to emphasize the rights of the states, 
a greater concern with living democracy in a rapidly changing society. The tendency 
was to manifest itself further in succeeding terms in other kinds of cases.
5 C. Sw isher, H is to ry  o f  t h e  Suprem e C o u r t  o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s : T h e  T aney P er iod  
1836-64, at 97-98 (1974). See generally id. at 99-204, 396-422, 457-83.
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state institutions to the constitutional interpretations of the United 
States Supreme Court remained undiminished. In Ableman v. Booth,5* 
Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the Court, rebuked the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court for denying the validity of an act of Congress and disre­
garding a writ of error that had issued from the United States Supreme 
Court. In Ableman, a defendant who had been convicted in the state 
court sought a writ of habeas corpus from the federal district court. 
Upon the federal district court’s grant of habeas corpus, the state court 
refused to recognize the authority of that federal court ultimately to 
dispose of the case on federal constitutional grounds. Thereafter, the 
prosecution appealed to the United States Supreme Court which issued 
a writ of error to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. That court refused to 
recognize the United States Supreme Court’s authority under the Judi­
ciary Act to review the state court’s decision since, in the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s opinion, that state court decision was “final.” In re­
sponse to the Wisconsin court’s contention, Chief Justice Taney reiter­
ated the views that Marshall had previously expressed:
[I]t is manifest that this ultimate appellate power in a tribunal created 
by the Constitution itself was deemed essential to secure the independ­
ence and supremacy of the General Government in the sphere of action 
assigned to it; to make the Constitution and laws of the United States 
uniform, and the same in every State; and to guard against evils which 
would inevitably arise from conflicting opinions between the courts of a 
State and of the United States, if there was no common arbiter authorized 
to decide between them.57 '
No state representative or institution may be allowed to block the 
enjoyment of rights secured the citizens of every state by the Constitu­
tion. This is as true of one who would block entrance through a school- 
house door as it is of those who would deny the protections of the first 
and fourteenth amendments to the citizens of the State of Utah. This 
point was reiterated by the United States Supreme Court in Cooper v. 
Aaron,5* wherein the Court was confronted with the argument by the 
Governor and Legislature of Arkansas that they were not bound to obey 
the orders of the federal district court in fashioning a desegregation plan 
for Little Rock schools as required under the earlier decision in Brown 
v. Board of Education,59 The Court in Cooper responded to this resist­
ance to the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court in the following language:
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the “ supreme 
law of the Land.”  In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unani­
mous Court, referring to the Constitution as “the fundamental and para­
56. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
57. Id. at 518-19.
58. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
HeinOnline -- 1975 Utah L. Rev. 609 1975
610 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1975: 593
mount law of the nation/* declared in the notable case of Marbury v. 
Madison . . . that “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judi­
cial department to say what the law is.” This decision declared the basic 
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law 
of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by 
this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of 
our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Four­
teenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the 
supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of 
binding effect on the States “ any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Every state legislator and execu­
tive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to 
Art. VI, cl. 3 , “ to support this Constitution.”  Chief Justice Taney, speak­
ing for a unanimous Court in 1859, said that this requirement reflected 
the framers’ “anxiety to preserve it [the Constitution] in full force, in all 
its powers, and to guard against resistance to or evasion of its authority, 
on the part of a State . . . .”
No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the 
Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.60
Thus, as shown by the cases from Marbury to Cooper, the United 
States Supreme Court must be recognized as the ultimate arbiter of 
federal constitutional issues that are presented before state courts, and 
those courts are bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court.
II. T he F ourteenth  A m endm ent  and  the  B ill of R ights
It is one of the first principles of my life, and one that I have culti­
vated from my childhood, having been taught it by my father, to allow 
every one the liberty of conscience. I am the greatest advocate of the 
Constitution of the United States there is on the earth. In my feelings I 
am always ready to die for the protection of the weak and oppressed in 
their just rights. The only fault I find with the Constitution is, it is not 
broad enough to cover the whole ground.
Although it provides that all men shall enjoy religious freedom, yet 
it does not provide the manner by which that freedom can be preserved, 
nor for the punishment of Government officers who refuse to protect the 
people in their religious rights, or punish these mobs, states, or communi­
ties who interfere with the rights of the people on account of their religion.
Its sentiments are good, but it provides no means of enforcing them. It has 
but this one fault. Under its provision, a man or a people who are able to 
protect themselves can get along well enough; but those who have the 
misfortune to be weak or unpopular are left to the merciless rage of popu­
lar fury.
Joseph Smith, Nauvoo, 18438'
60. 358 U.S. at 18.
61. VI J. Sm ith, H is to ry  o f  th e  C h urch  o f  Jesus C h r is t  o f  L a tte r -D a y  Saints 56­
57 (2d ed. B. Roberts 1950).
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Like many other local incidents, persecutions of Mormons in Mis­
souri and in Illinois, sanctioned on occasion by state governments and 
with mobs often led by state or local officials, were immune from federal 
interdiction to protect the Mormons in the enjoyment of their first 
amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, and assembly. When 
Joseph Smith, the Mormon leader, appealed for help to President Mar­
tin Van Buren, the latter responded with the statement, “[y]our cause 
is just but I can do nothing for you.”62 Whatever Van Buren’s motive,63 
this result was mandated by Barron u. Baltimore,64 the first case which 
presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to determine the 
scope of the prohibitions against governmental action provided by the 
Bill of Rights. In Barron, the petitioner sued the city for diverting 
streams in such a manner that his wharf in Baltimore harbor was with­
out value. He claimed that the city had violated the fifth amendment 
prohibition against taking private property for public use “without just 
compensation.” Barron argued that the fifth amendment, “being in 
favor of the liberty of the citizen, ought to be so construed as to restrain 
the legislative power of a state, as well as that of the United States,”65 
but Marshall held that the Bill of Rights spoke only to the national 
government and did not limit state action.66
Following the Civil War, the thirteenth amendment, while legiti­
mating the Emancipation Proclamation, did not provide an unambi­
guous authorization67 for federal legislation designed to insure civil 
rights for former slaves still trammelled by the “black codes” of several 
southern states.68 The fourteenth amendment, ratified in 1868, was de­
signed in part at least to validate the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which 
was similarly passed to destroy the “black codes.” Two of the three 
major provisions69 of the fourteenth amendment—the “due process” and
62. Id. at 57.
63. 2*B. R o b e rts , A C om prehensive H is to ry  o f  th e  C h u rch  30 & n.17 (1930) (sug­
gesting pre-election year political motives for this statement).
64. 32 U.S. 153, 7 Pet. 243 (1833).
65. Id. at 156, 7 Pet. at 247.
66. Id. at 159, 7 Pet. at 250-51. As Justice Crockett noted in Phillips, the first 
amendment expressly restrains “ Congress.** The seventh amendment is addressed to “ any 
Court of the United States.’* All of the other amendments comprising the Bill of Rights 
speak only in general terms. Therefore, prior to the fourteenth amendment, the literal 
language of those two amendments arguably was merely a restraint upon federal action, 
while the more general terms of the other amendments were arguably intended to restrain 
state action as well. See IIW . C rossk ey , supra note 34, at 1056-66.
67. While the thirteenth amendment included an implementing clause and Con­
gress acted thereunder in 1866, it was seriously questioned whether the terms of the 
amendment were sufficiently broad to authorize the sweeping provisions of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 427-37 (1968).
68. For a  description  o f  “ black codes** and their im p a ct see V IC . Fairman, H is to ry  
o f  th e  Suprem e C o u r t  o f  t h e  U n ited  S ta te s : R e c o n s tr u c t io n  and R eunion  1864-88, at 
110-17, 1178-79, 1226-28 (1971).
69. U.S. C o n st , amend. XIV, § 1 provides: ‘
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“equal protection” clauses—have provided the nexus for the constitu­
tional protection of individuals against state government intrusion 
throughout the course of the development of constitutional law in this 
century. With the exception of the grand jury indictment requirement 
of the fifth amendment and the civil offenses jury trial provision of the 
seventh amendment, virtually every specific procedural guarantee of the 
Bill of Rights, together with every substantive and procedural guarantee 
of the first amendment, has now been held applicable to the states by 
way of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, just as they 
are applied directly to the federal government. That is the status of the 
law as announced by our nation’s highest tribunal. The clarity, specific­
ity, notoriety, and longevity of this condition is what makes the Phillips 
decision a lawless act.
The law, however, was not always so. The Slaughter-House Cases70 
limited so strictly one of the three major provisions of the fourteenth 
amendment—the “privileges and immunities” clause—that while it 
might have more naturally provided the vehicle to accomplish what was 
done more awkwardly through the due process clause,71 and while it may 
yet provide a bulwark against intrusive and arbitrary government,72 it 
is today virtually a dead letter.73 Other cases followed Barron in similar 
fashion, strictly construing the provisions of the fourteenth amend­
ment.74
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im­
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
70. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court upheld a 
Louisiana statute granting an exclusive right to a state corporation to operate certain 
livestock facilities which shut down competing butchers, and rejected a broad interpreta­
tion of the privileges and immunities clause, which may have protected the independent 
butchers.
71. Some commentators have argued that the historical intent of the privileges and 
immunities clause was to incorporate the Bill of Rights. E.g., Levy, Introduction to C. 
Fairman & S. M o rr iso n , T h e  F o u r te e n th  Am endm ent and th e  B i l l  o f  R igh ts : T h e  
In co rp o ra t io n  T h e o r y  at XIH-XIV (1970); Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law 
and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U.L. R ev. 740, 752 (1974).
72. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: uIts Hour Come Round At 
Last” ?, 1972 Wash. U.L.Q. 405, 419-20 concludes:
With government in control of so many essentials of our life, where in the 
Constitution can we turn for haven against the impositions of 1984? . . . .
. . . [I]f the legislative and executive discretion is to be limited by the Consti­
tution on such matters as public education, public welfare, and public housing; 
police, fire, and sanitation; ecology; and, to repeat, most importantly, with refer­
ence to the right of privacy, I expect it will come as an attempt to define the 
privileges or immunities of American citizenship.
73. See, e.g., Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 90-93 (1940); McElvaine v. Brush, 
142 U.S. 155, 158-59 (1891); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-48 (1890).
74. In Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877), the Court strictly construed “ due 
process” in the fourteenth amendment as applied to an assessment on real property by a
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But with Twining u. New Jersey,15 while rejecting the view that the 
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was “incorpo­
rated” into the fourteenth through its due process clause, the Court by 
dicta began78 the creation of a naturalist or “fundamental law” formula 
which provided a means by which, through judicial inclusion and exclu­
sion, procedural protections mostly77 found within the Bill of Rights and 
considered to be integral to procedural and substantive justice, were 
held to be applicable to the states.
The first freedom of the Bill of Rights to be considered protected 
against state violation by virtue of the due process clause of the four­
teenth amendment was—most appropriate to the present consideration 
of Phillips and consistent with thoughts expressed as early as the first 
Congress78—the free speech clause of the first amendment. In Gitlow v.
state statute for drainage of swamps and held that such an assessment did not deprive a 
property owner of his property without due process of law. While the Court strictly con­
strued the meaning of “ due process of law,”  it nevertheless recognized, in dictum, that a 
more expansive definition could gradually develop:
[TJhere is wisdom, we think, in the ascertaining of the intent and application of 
such an important phrase in the Federal Constitution, by the gradual process of 
judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall require, 
with the reasoning on which such decisions may be founded.
Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
75. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
76. Justice Harlan, in dissent in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), planted 
the seed for the future development of a naturalist interpretation of “ due process of law” 
when he stated that this constitutional term embodied “ fundamental principles of liberty 
and justice,”  which may be applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment. Id. 
at 558 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The naturalist approach to defining the due process clause of the fourteenth amend­
ment was again recognized by the Court in Twining when it stated:
[The defendants] appeal to another clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
insist that the self-incrimination, which they allege the instruction to the jury 
compelled, was a denial of due process of law. This contention requires separate 
consideration, for it is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the 
first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against 
state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law. . . .
If this is so, it is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amend­
ments, but because they are of such a nature that they are included in the concep­
tion of due process of law.
211 U.S. at 99.
77. The naturalist formula may protect some procedural rights in the due process 
clause which are not specifically included within the Bill of Rights. In In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358 (1970), the Court held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was among the 
“ essentials of due process and fair treatment”  protected by the due process clause and 
must therefore be the standard of proof in a juvenile, adjudicatory proceeding. Id„ at 359, 
364. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484-86 (1965) (recognizing that penumbral 
rights emanating from the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights may be protected under 
the due process clause). .
78. In considering a proposed amendment to the Constitution which essentially 
embodied the guarantees of what ultimately became the first amendment, Madison “ con­
ceived”  of this amendment as “ the most valuable amendment in the whole list.”  1 A n nals
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New York,79 where the defendant had been convicted of violating a New 
York statute which prohibited the advocacy of criminal anarchy, the 
Court rejected on the merits the defendant’s position that the statute 
violated his first amendment freedom of speech, but conceded that this 
liberty was protected against state intrusion by the due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment. The Court said:
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech 
and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from 
abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and 
“liberties” protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment from impairment by the States.80
Since Gitlow, the Court’s technique of “selective incorporation” has 
reached the point where every significant protection afforded the indi­
vidual by the first amendment against the federal government has been 
extended through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 
against impairment by the states.81 Furthermore, the same exacting 
standards imposed by the Bill of Rights upon the federal government 
are laid against state action by the due process clause, “jot-for-jot and 
case-for-case,”82 “bag and baggage,”83 without any loss of integrity.84
Today, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment forbids
o f  C on g . 784 (1789). Madison thought that the protections of the first amendment should 
be imposed upon the states as well as upon the federal government:
If there was any reason to restrain the Government of the United States from 
infringing upon these essential rights,, it was equally necessary that they should be 
secured against the State Governments. He thought that if they provided against 
the one, it was as necessary to provide against the other, and was satisfied that it 
would be equally grateful to the people.
Id.
79. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
80. Id. at 666.
81. See notes 85-102 infra and accompanying text.
82. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 213 (Fortas, J., concurring).
84. The provisions of the Bill of Rights which are incorporated through the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment apply against the states to the same extent 
and in the same manner that they apply to the federal government. In Malloy v. Hogan, 
378 U.S. 1 (1964), the Court held that “ the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed the peti­
tioner the protection of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination, and 
that under the applicable federal standard, the [state court] erred in holding that the 
privilege was not properly invoked.”  Id. at 3 (emphasis added). The Court further ex­
plained:
The State urges, however, that the availability of the federal privilege to a witness 
* in a state inquiry is to be determined according to a less stringent standard than is 
applicable in a federal proceeding. We disagree. We have held that the guarantees 
of the First Amendment. . . the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures 
of the Fourth Amendment. . . and the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth , 
Amendment . . . are all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth 
Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights 
against federal encroachment. . . . The Court thus has rejected the notion that the ,
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a state from taking an individual’s property for public use without just 
compensation;85 it protects an individual’s freedom of speech,86 free exer­
cise of religion,87 assembly,88 the press,89 petition,90 and his right to be 
free from a state establishment of religion;91 it assures his freedom from 
unlawful search and seizure,92 from being placed in double jeopardy,93 
and from self-incrimination;94 it guarantees a speedy95 and public96 crim­
inal trial by an impartial97 jury98 after notification of charges;99 it ensures 
the right to counsel100 and compulsory process for obtaining witnesses;101 
and it prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.102
If the Utah court had recognized and honored the law of the Consti­
tution that they are under oath to sustain, as represented by the long 
line of cases herein analyzed holding the essential procedural protec­
tions of the Bill of Rights inviolate also from state infringement by way 
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, but criticized 
the means by which some of those provisions have been “selectively
Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a “ watered-down, subjective 
version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights” . . . .
Id. at 10-11.
In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court held: “Because we believe 
that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we 
hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases 
which—were they to be tried in a federal court—would come within the Sixth Amend­
ment’s guarantee.”  Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the Court held that the fifth amendment 
double jeopardy protection was incorporated against the states to protect individual con­
stitutional guarantees, and stated that “ [o]nce it is decided that a particular Bill of 
Rights guarantee is ‘fundamental to the American scheme of justice,* . . .  the same 
constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal Governments.”  Id. at 
795.
85. E.g., Chicago, B.&Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
86. E.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 
666 (1925).
87. E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
88. E.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
89. E.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).
90. E.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941) (dictum).
91. E.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
92. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 
25 (1949).
93. E.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
94. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 
78 (1908).
95. E.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967).
96. E.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
97. E.g., Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
98. E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
99. E.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
100. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
101. E.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
102. E.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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incorporated” into the due process clause, it conceivably could have 
made a contribution to the issue of incorporation. The consequences of 
“means,” here as in so many areas of the law, are enormous. The realiza­
tion of proper means, as opposed to a total preoccupation with substan­
tive ends, is after all at the center of the concept of due process or 
procedural justice.
Over the years of debate regarding the procedural content of the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment and its relationship to the 
Bill of Rights, two analytical approaches have been fashioned. One ap­
proach, characterized by a naturalistic impulse and associated with 
Justices Cardozo, Frankfurter, Harlan, and now Powell, directs atten­
tion toward the “fundamental,” “basic,” and innately moral content of 
the right in question.103 The second more characteristically positivist
103. While the Court in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), rejected a 
particular incorporationist argument (which rejection was later overruled in Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)), it created the beginning of a formula which was ultimately to 
provide the vehicle by which many of the freedoms and liberties of the Bill of Rights were 
to be accorded citizens against the states. See the dictum of the Twining Court, supra 
note 76.
Mr. Justice Cardozo provided the core concept by which values that were considered 
to be fundamental to procedural justice were to be evaluated with respect to their inclu­
sion within the idea of due process. In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), the 
defendant urged the Court to reverse a state criminal conviction which allegedly violated 
the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment, in that a state statute had allowed 
the prosecution to appeal the decision, and retry the case if the appeal was upheld. After 
the state court reversed the defendant’s second degree murder conviction, he was retried 
and convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. While the Court rejected 
the “ incorporation”  of double jeopardy through the due process clause (later overruled in 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)), Cardozo stated that:
On the other hand, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may 
make it unlawful for a state to abridge by its statutes the freedom of speech which 
the First Amendment safeguards against encroachment by the Congress . . .  or the 
like freedom of the press . . .  or the free exercise of religion . . .  or the right of 
peaceable assembly, without which speech would be unduly trammeled . . .  or the 
right of one accused of crime to the benefit of counsel . . . .  In these and other 
situations immunities that are valid as against the federal government by force of 
the specific pledges of particular amendments have been found to be implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
become valid as against the states.
The line of division may seem to be wavering and broken if there is a hasty 
catalogue of the cases on the one side and the other. Reflection and analysis will 
induce a different view. There emerges the perception of a rationalizing principle 
which gives to discrete instances a proper order and coherence. The right to trial 
by jury and the immunity from prosecution except as the result of an indictment 
may have value and importance. Even so, they are not of the very essence of a 
scheme of ordered liberty. To abolish them is not to violate a “ principle of justice 
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda­
mental.”
302 U.S. at 324-25.
Justice Frankfurter continued this approach in his concurring opinion in Adamson 
v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1927):
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approach is dominantly associated with Justice Hugo Black and, with 
important differences, Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and Gold-
A construction which gives to due process no independent function but turns 
it into a summary of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights would, as has been 
noted, tear up by the roots much of the fabric of law in the several States, and would 
deprive the States of opportunity for reforms in legal process designed for extending 
the area of freedom. . . . Such a view not only disregards the historic meaning of 
“ due process.”  It leads inevitably to a warped construction of specific provisions of 
the Bill of Rights to bring within their scope conduct clearly condemned by due 
process but not easily fitting into the pigeon-holes of the specific provisions. It 
seems pretty late in the day to suggest that a phrase so laden with historic meaning 
should be given an improvised content consisting of some but not all of the provi­
sions of the first eight Amendments, selected on an undefined basis, with improvis­
ation of content for the provisions so selected.
And so, when, as in a case like the present, a conviction in a State court is here 
for review under a claim that a right protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment has been denied, the issue is not whether an infraction of 
one of the specific provisions of the first eight Amendments is disclosed by the 
record. The relevant question is whether the criminal proceedings which resulted 
in conviction deprived the accused of the due process of law to which the United 
States Constitution entitled him. Judicial review of that guaranty of the Fourteenth 
Amendment inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the 
whole course of the proceedings in order to ascertain whether they offend those 
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English­
speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses. These 
standards of justice are not authoritatively formulated anywhere as though they 
were prescriptions in a pharmacopoeia. But neither does the application of the Due 
Process Clause imply that judges are wholly at large. The judicial judgment in 
applying the Due Process Clause must move within the limits of accepted notions 
of justice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal 
judgment.
Id. at 67-68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), three state policemen broke into peti­
tioner’s room, “jumped upon him** in an attempt to force out of his mouth or stomach 
two capsules they had seen him take during their forced entry, and took him to a hospital 
where, against his will, he was given an emetic solution through a tube into his stomach. 
The petitioner vomited out the pills which were found to contain morphine, and they were 
entered as evidence which ultimately led to his conviction at state trial. The Supreme 
Court reversed the state conviction. In speaking for the Court, Justice Frankfurter sus­
tained and elaborated upon Cardozo’s "concept of ordered liberty” :
However, this Court too has its responsibility. Regard for the requirements of 
the Due Process Clause “ inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judg­
ment upon the whole course of the proceedings [resulting in a conviction] in order 
to ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness which express 
the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with 
the most heinous offenses.”  . . . These standards of justice are not authoritatively 
formulated anywhere as though they were specifics. Due process of law is a summa­
rized constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal immunities which, as 
Mr. Justice Cardozo twice wrote for the Court, are “ so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”  . . .  or are “ implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty. . . .”
. . . This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the 
privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was 
there, the forcible extraction of his stomach’s contents—this course of proceeding
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berg. Justice Black, for example, joined by Justice Douglas, presented 
in dissent in Adamson u. California104 a lengthy appendix arguing that 
the intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment was to incorpo-
by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened 
sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and screw to permit of constitu­
tional differentiation.
Id. at 169, 172.
Justice Harlan’s position, following in the tradition of Cardozo and Frankfurter, can 
be seen from his concurring opinion in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), wherein 
the Court held that the sixth amendment right to jury trial did not mandate a twelve man 
jury:
These decisions demonstrate that the difference between a “ due process” ap­
proach, that considers each particular case on its own bottom to see whether the 
right alleged is one “ implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”  . . . and “selective 
incorporation” is not an abstract one whereby different verbal formulae achieve the 
same results. The internal logic of the selective incorporation doctrine cannot be 
respected if the Court is both committed to interpreting faithfully the meaning of 
the federal Bill of Rights and recognizing the governmental diversity that exists in 
this country. The “backlash” in Williams exposes the malaise, for there the Court 
dilutes a federal guarantee in order to reconcile the logic of “ incorporation,”  the 
“jot-for-jot and case-for-case” application of the federal right to the States, with 
the reality of federalism. Can one doubt that had Congress tried to undermine the 
common-law right to trial by jury before Duncan came on the books the history 
today recited would have barred such action? Can we expect repeat performances 
when this Court is called upon to give definition and meaning to other federal 
guarantees that have been “ incorporated” ?
Id. at 129-30 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Justice Powell would seem to have taken the mantle from Justice Harlan as can be 
seen in his decisive concurring opinion in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), wherein 
the Court held that a state jury verdict need not be unanimous to satisfy the requirements 
of the sixth amendment right to jury trial as incorporated through the fourteenth amend­
ment due process clause. Justice Powell disagreed with the majority’s major premise that 
“ the concept of jury trial, as applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
must be identical in every detail to the concept required in federal courts by the Sixth 
Amendment.”  Id. at 369 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell framed the issue before 
the Court as follows:
The question, therefore, that should be addressed in this case is whether unan­
imity is in fact so fundamental to the essentials of jury trial that this particular 
requirement of the Sixth Amendment is necessarily binding on the States under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. An affirmative answer . . . 
would give unwarranted and unwise scope to the incorporation doctrine as it applies 
to the due process right of state criminal defendants to trial by jury.
Id. at 373. While Justice Powell would require unanimity in federal court proceedings, the 
states should be left free “ to experiment with adjudicatory processes different from the 
federal model.”  Id. at 375. What is required of state criminal procedure by the fourteenth 
amendment’s due process clause is not lock-step uniformity with the federal system, but 
adherence to “what is fundamental in jury trial.”  Id. at 376. '
104. 332 U.S. 46 (1947). In Adamson v. California, the Court held that the fifth 
amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not incorporated against the states. 
Mr. Justice Black, the primary supporter of total incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
through the fourteenth amendment, expounded his position in dissent as follows:
My study of the historical events that culminated in the Fourteenth Amend­
ment, and the expressions of those who sponsored and favored, as well as those who 
opposed its submission and passage, persuades me that one of the chief objects that
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rate therein all of the Bill of Rights.105 While no Court majority has ever 
accepted this position,108 most Supreme Court justices have agreed that 
the centrality of the focus upon the provisions of the Bill of Rights 
should govern the content of the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment, and that fact is critical, even though the process has been 
that of “selective*” rather than “total” incorporation. The result, 
whether by a naturalistic examination of “fundamental” rights or a 
positivistic inclusion or exclusion of specific provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, has been to “absorb” or “incorporate” every significant criminal 
procedural provision of the first eight amendments together with the
the provisions of the Amendment’s first section, separately, and as a whole, were 
intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights, applicable to the states. 
With full knowledge of the import of the Barron decision, the framers and backers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment proclaimed its purpose to be to overturn the consti­
tutional rule that case had announced.
Id. at 71-72 (Black, J., dissenting). In continuing, Justice Black noted:
I cannot consider the Bill of Rights to be an outworn 18th Century “strait 
jacket” as the Twining opinion did. Its provisions may be thought outdated abstrac­
tions by some. And it is true that they were designed to meet ancient evils. But 
they are the same kind of human evils that have emerged from century to century 
wherever excessive power is sought by the few at the expense of the many. In my 
judgment the people of no nation can lose their liberty so long as a Bill of Rights 
like ours survives and its basic purposes are conscientiously interpreted, enforced 
and respected so as to afford continuous protection against old, as well as new, 
devices and practices which might thwart those purposes. I fear to see the conse­
quences of the Court’s practice of substituting its own concepts of decency and 
fundamental justice for the language of the Bill of Rights as its point of departure 
in interpreting and enforcing that Bill of Rights. If the choice must be between the 
selective process of the Palko decision applying some of the Bill of Rights to the 
states, or the Twining rule applying none of them, I would choose the Palko selec­
tive process. But rather than accept either of these choices, I would follow what I 
believe was the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment—to extend to all 
the people of the nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights. To hold that 
this Court can determine what, if any, provisions of the Bill of Rights will be 
enforced, and if so to what degree, is to frustrate the great design of a written 
Constitution.
Id. at 89.
105. 332 U.S. at 92-123. For an historical rebuttal to Justice Black’s position see 
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original 
Understanding, 2 Stan . L. R ev. 5 (1949). But see Crosskey, Charles Fairman, “Legislative 
History, ”  and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. Chi. L. R ev. 1 
(1954).
106.
Between the incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment into the Constitution 
and the beginning of the present membership of the Court—a period of seventy 
years—the scope of that Amendment was passed upon by forty-three judges. Of all 
these judges, only one, who may respectfully be called an eccentric exception, ever 
indicated the belief that the Fourteenth Amendment was a shorthand summary of 
the first eight Amendments theretofore limiting only the Federal Government, and 
that due process incorporated those eight Amendments as restrictions upon the 
powers of the States.
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 62 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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substantive rights enumerated within the first amendment.107
Nevertheless, it is suggested that these two different approaches do 
not necessarily lead to the same result. While subjectivity is not by any 
means eliminated by either approach,108 the chance of reaching a proper 
result is at least furthered by asking the right questions and directing 
attention to the crucial issue.109 That would seem to be done by focusing 
on the fundamental nature of the right in question and its relationship 
to procedural justice, rather than looking directly at a particular provi­
sion of the Bill of Rights for the purpose of making a mechanical decision 
to “exclude or include.” It would seem in addition that greater latitude 
could be afforded to the states to experiment creatively in the realm of 
criminal procedure if the precise standard which the Bill of Rights im­
poses on the federal government were not automatically demanded of 
the states.110 It may well be that future generations will perceive “funda­
107. See notes 85-102 supra and accompanying text.
108. In their judicial debates, Justices Black and Frankfurter each claimed that the 
other’s approach injected subjective moral judgments into the definition of the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Justice Frankfurter, in Adamson v. California, as­
serted that “ the Due Process Clause must move within the limits of accepted notions of 
justice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment,” 
332 U.S. at 68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), but criticized Black’s incorporationist ap­
proach which “ leads inevitably to a warped construction of specific provisions of the Bill 
of Rights to bring within their scope conduct clearly condemned by due process but not 
easily fitting into pigeon-holes of the specific provisions.” Id. at 67.
Justice Black, on the other hand, in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), dis­
agreed with the “nebulous standards”  set by the naturalist approach to incorporation 
because they lacked external criteria for fixing the content of procedural due process. 
Black argued that
[tjhere is, however, no express constitutional language granting judicial power to 
invalidate every state law of every kind deemed “unreasonable” or contrary to the 
Court’s notion of civilized decencies . . . .  Of even graver concern . . .  is the use 
of the philosophy to nullify the Bill of Rights. I long ago concluded that the 
accordion-like qualities of this philosophy must inevitably imperil all the individual 
liberty safeguards specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 176-77 (emphasis in original).
109. See Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication—A Survey 
and Criticism, 66 Y a le  L.J. 319 (1957).
110. As Justice Fortas stated in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968):
Neither logic nor history nor the intent of the draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment can possibly be said to require that the Sixth Amendment or its jury trial 
provision be applied to the States together with the total gloss that this Court’s 
decisions have supplied. The draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amendment intended 
what they said, not more or less: that no State shall deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law. It is ultimately the duty of this 
Court to interpret, to ascribe specific meaning to this phrase. There is no reason 
whatever for us to conclude that, in so doing, we are bound slavishly to follow not 
only the Sixth Amendment but all of its bag and baggage, however securely or 
insecurely affixed they may be by law and precedent to federal proceedings. To take 
this course, in my judgment, would be not only unnecessary but mischievous be­
cause it would inflict a serious blow upon the principle of federalism. The Due 
Process Clause commands us to apply its great standard to state court proceedings
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mental” norms of due process that should appropriately be demanded 
of the states under the fourteenth amendment, but not of the federal 
government under the due process clause of the fifth amendment.111
The current ambivalence between the two approaches to due pro­
cess interpretation can be seen in Duncan v. Louisiana,112 where the 
Court, in holding the sixth amendment right to jury trial in criminal 
cases applicable to state procedure by way of the due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment, seemed still to employ the Cardozo- 
Frankfurter approach looking toward “fundamental” rights, while sig­
nificantly altering the conventional terminology. Rather than examin­
ing whether a particular procedure was “implicit in the concept of or­
dered liberty” or required by “immutable principles of justice,” - the 
Court inquired whether the procedure was “fundamental to the Ameri­
can scheme of justice” :
Earlier the Court can be seen as having asked, when inquiring into 
whether some particular procedural safe-guard was required of a State, if 
a civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the particular 
protection. [Palko u. Connecticut] . . . .  The recent cases, on the other 
hand, have proceeded upon the valid assumption that state criminal pro­
cesses are not imaginary and theoretical schemes but actual systems bear­
ing virtually every characteristic of the common-law system that has been 
developing contemporaneously in England and in this country. The ques­
tion thus is whether given this kind of system a particular procedure is 
fundamental—whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to an Anglo- 
American regime of ordered liberty.113
The Court then held:
Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to 
the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which—were they to 
be tried in a federal court—would come within the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee.114
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to assure basic fairness. It does not command us rigidly and arbitrarily to impose 
the exact pattern of federal proceedings upon the 50 States. On the contrary, the 
Constitution’s command, in my view, is that in our insistence upon state observ­
ance of due process, we should, so far as possible, allow the greatest latitude for 
state differences. It requires, within the limits of the lofty basic standards that it 
prescribes for the States as well as the Federal Government, maximum opportunity 
for diversity and minimal imposition of uniformity of method and detail upon the 
States. Our Constitution sets up a federal union, not a monolith.
Id. at 213-14 (Fortas, J., concurring).
111. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). In Adamson v. California, Justice 
Frankfurter was of the opinion that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 
possessed “ independent potency”  that “ neither comprehends the specific provisions by 
which the founders deemed it appropriate to restrict the federal government nor is it 
confined to them.”  332 U.S. at 66.
112. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). '
113. Id. at 149 n.14.
114. Id. at 149.
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Whether the Court under the influence of Justice Powell will exam­
ine more acutely the fundamental nature of state criminal procedure, 
leaving some elasticity and creativity within the state systems, or 
whether the approach will be continued by which state procedure is 
mechanistically matched against federal procedure, may be influenced 
in part by state court opinions which contribute creatively to this dia­
logue.
III. A N ote on S ubstance: S tate  C ontrol  of P ornography
The purpose of this article has been to comment on the Phillips case 
as seen within the western tradition of the rule of law, here conceived 
to be a concept dominantly concerned with procedural means rather 
than substantive ends. The resolution of the Phillips case, therefore, is 
not central to our purpose. A brief view is expressed, however, simply 
to complete the analysis of Phillips.
Since the first amendment right of free speech has been considered 
since 1925115 to be absorbed within and protected by the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Utah Supreme Court was 
obliged to consider a free speech challenge to the constitutionality of the 
Utah pornography statute within the confines of the recent case law of 
the United States Supreme Court delimiting such state legislation. That 
obligation was not met.
Through its holding in Roth v. United States116 that obscene mate­
rial was not protected by the first and fourteenth amendments, the 
United States Supreme Court provided a means whereby states could 
pass pornography legislation without constitutional proscription. “Ob­
scene” material was to be determined by
whether to the average person, applying contemporary community stan­
dards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to 
prurient interest.117
In the course of his opinion, Justice Brennan justified the conclusion 
that the first amendment rights were not absolute and that obscenity 
or pornography was unprotected with the assertion that such material 
was “utterly without redeeming social importance.”118
In Memoirs v. Massachusetts,119 however, the Court in a plurality 
opinion took the earlier statement made in defense of the unprotected 
nature of obscenity, namely that it was without redeeming social im­
115. See notes 79-80 supra and accompanying text.
116. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In Roth v. United States, the Court upheld a federal 
statute that punished the mailing of “ obscene” publications, and sustained the conviction 
of a defendant who had violated that statute.
117. Id. at 489.
118. Id. at 484.
119. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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portance, and made it a part of the Roth test defining obscenity. Thus,
[u]nder this definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements 
must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the 
material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the 
material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary com­
munity standards relating to the description or representation of sexual 
matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.120
The addition of the last qualification pronounced in Roth simply as a 
descriptive comment, placed upon the states the nearly impossible bur­
den of proving a negative proposition. In addition, while in Roth the 
“community” by whose standards obscenity was to be determined was 
not defined, a national criterion soon emerged.
Subsequently, the Burger Court in Miller v. California121 returned 
to a test resembling the original Roth approach, scraping off the accre­
tions of intervening cases like Memoirs which had rendered state legisla­
tion and prosecution of pornography difficult, if not impossible. Miller 
eliminated the “utterly without redeeming social value” test122 (which 
had not been originally suggested as a “test” in Roth) by restoring as 
critical the “taken as a whole” phraseology of Roth, and defined the 
“community” by whose standards the definition would be interpreted 
as being “local,” presumably a state or local community standard, 
rather than a national one.123 In providing an element of statutory specif­
icity, the Miller Court established “basic guidelines” which could have 
been followed in Phillips for determining the constitutionality of the 
Utah pornography statute:
(a) whether “ the average person, applying contemporary community stan­
dards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient 
interest . . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently 
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value.124
The Utah statute at issue in Phillips125 was challenged on the basis 
that it was overbroad in proscribing the conduct of distributing porno­
graphic materials and therefore failed to satisfy requirements of statu­
tory specificity, contrary to the guidelines of Miller. Prior to the decision
120. Id. at 418. .
121. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the Court vacated the conviction of the appellant 
who had violated a California statute prohibiting the use of the mails for the distribution 
of unsolicited sexually explicit material.
122*. Id. at 24.
123. See id. at 30-34.
124. Id. at 24. For the most recent interpretation of the Miller standard in the 
United States Supreme Court see Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
125. Ch. 196, § 76-10-1204, [1973] Utah Laws 679. The Utah Supreme Court also 
relied upon the definition of “pornographic” contained in id. § 76-10-1203.
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in Phillips, the Utah Legislature, recognizing that the state in its legisla­
tion, as well as in its adjudication, must abide by the constitutional 
limitations imposed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend­
ment, amended the state pornography statute to conform more closely 
to the Miller definition.128
It is unclear whether the older state law as seen in Phillips, prior 
to its amendment specifically to accord with Miller, would have with­
stood a challenge, properly evaluated by the Utah court, using the 
Miller formula. The old statute, much more vague than its specific127 
successor, might possibly have survived, since there is case law permit­
ting a court to read into a particular state statute, otherwise impermis­
sibly vague or overbroad, the Miller specificity requirements and by 
such judicial interpretation avoid invalidation of the law for due process 
violation.128 Regardless of how the old statute would have fared if 
Phillips had been accorded due process of law by the Utah Supreme 
Court, the new statute, drafted particularly to conform to Miller and 
patterned after the Oregon statute that was cited by the Miller Court 
as being substantially adequate to protect the constitutional freedom of 
speech,129 is somewhat more secure from such constitutional attacks.
IV. C onclusion— P rocedural Justice and  the  R ule of L aw
The reason why Men enter into society, is the preservation of their 
Property,130 and the end why they choose and authorize a legislative, is, 
that there may be laws made, and Rules set as Guards and Fences to the 
Properties of all the Members of the Society, to limit the Power, and 
moderate the Dominion of every Part and Member of the Society . . . .
John Locke131
The Utah Supreme Court in Phillips denied the defendants those
126. U tah  C od e  A nn. § 76-10-1203 (Supp. 1975) defines “pornographic material or 
performance” as follows:
(1) Any material or performance is pornographic if:
(a) The average person, applying contemporary community standards, 
finds that, taken as a whole, it appeals to prurient interest in sex;
(b) It is patently offensive in the description or depiction of nudity, sexual 
conduct, sexual excitement, sado-masochistic abuse, or excretion; and
(c) Taken as a whole it does not have serious literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value.
127. Compare ch . 196, § 76-10-1203, [1973] U tah Law s 679 with U tah  C ode  Ann. 
§ 76-10-1203 (Supp. 1975).
128. See, e.g., United States v. 12 200-ft Reels of Super 8 MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 
130 n.7 (1973); United States v. Thevis, 484 F.2d 1149, 1154-55 (5th Cir. 1973); Gibbs v. 
State, 504 S.W.2d 719, 724-25 (Ark. 1974).
129. 413 U.S. at 24 n.6. Compare O re . Rev. S ta t . § 167.060 (Supp. 1974) with U tah  
C od e  Ann. § 76-10-1201 (Supp. 1975).
130. Locke broadly defined “property” to include our “ lives, liberties, and estates.” 
J. L ock e , S econ d  T re a t is e  o f  C iv il G overn m en t ch. IX, H 123 (T . Cook ed. 1947).
131. Id. ch. XIX, H 222.
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rights protected by that amendment within the Bill of Rights considered 
by many to be “first among equals/’132 and did so in spite of fifty years 
of United States Supreme Court case law holding consistently that first 
amendment rights are protected against state infringement by the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. By that holding, as well 
as in dictum denying the applicability of the Bill of Rights as a check 
upon state government, the Utah court rejected the supreme law of the 
land that recognizes every important criminal procedural provision of 
the first eight amendments as being obligatory upon the states.
Whether “substantive justice” was done, (i . e the “end” determi­
nation that the defendant in fact violated a valid criminal statute and 
therefore deserved punishment) is beyond the scope of this article and 
has accordingly been treated summarily.133 Nevertheless, while 
resolution of the immediate question as to the constitutionality of 
Utah’s pornography statute has been deferred to future cases by the 
thoroughgoing revision of the statute after the filing of but prior to the 
decision in Phillips in an attempt to comport with Miller, the question 
of substantive justice or the justness of “ends” is vital, and that fact is 
not likely to be lost sight of in a society possessing more homogeneity 
than most. On the contrary, a relatively integrated society such as that 
served by the Utah Supreme Court is likely to be less patient with the 
concept of procedural justice, or the justness of “means,” often consider­
ing such to be procedural “details” manipulated by part of the legal 
profession in order that substantive justice may be frustrated. When a 
society possesses a common paradigm or world view it may not appre­
ciate the necessities, imposed upon the broader community by the pres­
ence of groups possessing differently conceived ends based upon radi­
cally different paradigms, to retreat in many areas of governance from 
government-mandated ends to consensus as to means, which is often the 
only possible area of unanimity. But pluralism means essentially that, 
and the rule of law, that strange and fragile flower that blossomed only 
in Western European culture and which has been transplanted with 
indifferent success beyond, is based on that notion. With the breakdown 
of a simpler feudal culture with its economy and society based upon the 
land, with the rise of greater diversity in political and religious beliefs
brought on by the Renaissance and Reformation, with the loss of secular 
power by the Western Church and the fragmentation of imperial gover­
nance, and with the rise of a capitalist economy and national markets, 
a legal system evolved that provided for a diversity of ends while main­
taining some degree of consensus on means. John Locke described such 
a system when he wrote of the law as “Guards and Fences,” separating 
the meum and the tuum, while leaving the selection of ends to be sought
132. See, e.g., Cahn, The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 Y a le  L.J. 464, 464­
81 (1956); Wechsler, supra note 71, at 743.
133. See notes 115-29 supra and accompanying text.
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by such means to the individual. Procedural justice is the hallmark of 
an individualistic culture built up from an older more communal society 
that was fragmented by the revolutions of religion, nationalism, eco­
nomic systems, and industrial technology.
Procedural justice is cold, “blue” in the McLuhanesque tongue; it 
does not possess the emotionally satisfying heat or “redness” of an end- 
oriented Utopia of Sir Thomas More, nor that of Augustine’s City of God 
where men through divine vision uniformly understand objective reality 
and morality. Procedural justice reflects the disintegration of modern 
society. The writings of Freud and Marx have reflected the psychologi­
cal and sociological filters which may interfere with our perception of 
absolutes in our present condition. While these grave deficiencies in 
means taken alone134 are real, the situation cannot be overcome by a 
coerced uniformity upon ends. Indeed, the agreement upon political and 
legal means may represent the prime bulwark of civilization remaining 
to a society irretrievably divided as to substantive ends.
The rule of law—that concept devised to insulate a judicial system 
from the direct influence of politics, kin, and religion to the blessing 
alike of the religious or political minority and the capitalist in need of 
predictability in laws and government—recognized this and relegated 
the search for a uniformity on ends to the means of persuasion and by 
long-suffering, not by force or domination. The concept of due process 
or procedural justice is at the center of a rule of law which must allow 
diversity and individuality to govern the selection of ends. The rule of 
law—being predominantly a system of rational procedure or 
means—will always lack the natural support which can be generated by 
a passionate call for the accomplishment of a particular end of substan­
tive justice. In an age when all societal institutions seem to be under 
assault, particularly those of national scope that bind us together and 
without which we unravel into a heterogeneous collection of special 
interest groups, the consensus on procedural means becomes a pearl of 
great price. Its preservation is essential if at least some of the effects of 
anomie are to be avoided.
Such a system, demanding more than an intuitive or a “common 
sense” or “folk wisdom” appreciation sufficient to continue the quest for 
the ends of substantive justice, places particularly great demands upon 
a professional lawyer-class to see that the integrity of the procedural 
system of means is preserved and defended. In contrast to the civil law
134. As stated in G ilm ore, The Storrs Lectures: The Age of Anxiety, 84 Y a le  L .J .
1022, 1044 (1975):
Law reflects but in no sense determines the moral worth of a society. A reasona­
bly just society will reflect its values in a reasonably just law. The better the society, 
the less law there will be. In Heaven there will be no law and the lion will lie down 
with the lamb. An unjust society will reflect its values in an unjust law. The worse 
the society, the more law there will be. In Hell there will be nothing but law, and 
due process will be meticulously observed.
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tradition where the great men of the law have been legislative lawgivers 
or executive fathers of great code systems, the common law tradition has 
seen its great men of the law, appropriate to a system created by court- 
made law, as being those on the Bench: Coke, Mansfield, Marshall, 
Story, Kent, Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, Hughes, Frankfurter.135 The 
Utah Supreme Court abandoned that tradition in Phillips.
135. The tribute given Mr. Justice Cardozo by another of our greatest jurists,
Learned Hand, presents the ideal traits of a judge in our culture:
[T]he wise man is the detached man. By that I mean more than detached from 
his grosser interests—his advancement and his gain. Many of us can be that—I dare 
to believe that most judges can be, and are. I am thinking of something far more 
subtly interfused. Our convictions, our outlook, the whole make-up of our thinking, 
which we cannot help bringing to the decision of every question, is the creature of 
our past; and into our past have been woven all sorts of frustrated ambitions with 
their envies, and of hopes of preferment with their corruptions, which, long since 
forgotten, still determine our conclusions. A wise man is one exempt from the 
handicap of such a past; he is a runner stripped for the race; he can weigh the 
conflicting factors of his problem without always finding himself in one scale or the 
other. Cardozo was such a man; his gentle nature had in it no acquisitiveness; he 
did not use himself as a measure of value; the secret of his humor—a precious gift 
that he did not wear upon his sleeve—lay in his ability to get outside of himself, 
and look back. Yet from this self-effacement came a power greater than the power 
of him who ruleth a city. He was wise because his spirit was uncontaminated, 
because he knew no violence, or hatred, or envy, or jealousy, or ill-will. I believe 
that it was this purity that chiefly made him the judge we so much revere; more 
than his learning, his acuteness, and his fabulous industry. In this America of ours 
where the passion for publicity is a disease, and where swarms of foolish, tawdry 
moths dash with rapture into its consuming fire, it was a rare good fortune that 
brought to such eminence a man so reserved, so unassuming, so retiring, so gracious 
to high and low, and so serene.
H and, A Tribute to Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 H arv. L . R ev. 361, 362-63 (1939).
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